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DOES IT PAY TO BE A MANAGER?               
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MANAGER 
RULE IN ANALYZING RETALIATION 
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII 
CRISTINA GIAPPONE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Retaliation by employers in the workforce is a recurring 
issue in today’s society.  Retaliation claims in the workplace are 
becoming more frequent and common.  According to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the number of 
retaliation charges filed annually with the agency has grown 
considerably, with approximately 22.6% of EEOC charge filings 
in the 1997 fiscal year to 44.5% in the 2015 fiscal year being 
retaliation based.1 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”) to protect employees in the workplace “from 
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of certain protected 
statuses.”2  However, the question remains whether employees 
who serve in a managerial role engage in a protected activity 
under Title VII when they oppose the actions of their employer in 
the normal course of their job responsibilities. 
Courts are split on whether employees must step outside 
their role as managers and assert their own adverse employment 
action against their employer to have engaged in protected 
activity under Title VII.3  This requirement is known as the 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2013, Marist College. I thank my 
family for their unconditional love and support. 
1 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2017). 
2 LISA J. BANKS & SAM KRAMER, A.L.I., Emerging Issues in Anti-Discrimination 
Law, SX021 ALI-CLE 275 § 1 (2016). 
3 Compare DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the manager rule does not apply to Title VII claims), with Brush v. Sears 
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“manager rule.”4  The question of whether to apply the manager 
rule to retaliation claims under Title VII is significant because it 
will determine whether employees will be discouraged from 
bringing such claims or will feel empowered to do so; whether 
employees will face a challenge in bringing a claim;5 or whether 
employers will be bombarded with a plethora of claims.6 
In 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit issued an opinion on the manager rule as it applies to 
Title VII that created a circuit split with a 2012 decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.7  In 
DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
“ ‘manager rule’ has no place in Title VII jurisprudence.”8  Basing 
its reasoning on the differing language between the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Title VII, as well as Supreme Court 
precedent, the court refused to apply the manager rule in the 
Title VII context.9  But, in Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., the 
Eleventh Circuit found the manager rule, as defined in the FLSA 
context in McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc.,10 persuasive and applied it 
against certain individuals trying to recover under Title VII.11 
This Note argues that the manager rule should be applied to 
Title VII cases but in a new and very specific and detailed 
context involving a case-by-case analysis, similar to that of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.  This Note is 
comprised of three parts.  Part I provides the history of Title VII 
generally, and discusses the emergence of the manager rule in 
the FLSA context.  Part II addresses how different federal circuit 
 
Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the manager rule 
applies to Title VII claims and employees must cross the line from being an 
employee completing her normal responsibilities to an employee filing a personal 
complaint against her employer). 
4 McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996). 
5 DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423 (“First, under the balancing test adopted by this 
Circuit . . . an employer may not be liable under Title VII if an employee’s conduct at 
work is sufficiently ‘insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive.’ . . . Second, the 
Supreme Court has provided employers with an affirmative defense under certain 
circumstances when an employee fails to report and to take advantage of an 
employer’s internal investigation processes.”). 
6 Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008). 
7 Compare DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 424, with Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787. 
8 DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 413. 
9 Id. at 422–24. 
10 McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996). 
11 Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787. 
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courts have either recognized or rejected the manager rule as it 
applies to retaliation claims in the Title VII context.  Part III 
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of the manager rule and 
proposes a solution that the manager rule should be applied to 
Title VII cases using a case-by-case analysis similar to that of the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosenfield. 
I. THE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MANAGER RULE 
A. Legal Background of Title VII 
Title VII is a federal law created to “protect[] employees from 
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of certain protected 
statuses.”12  The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, § 704(a), 
provides that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing . . . . 
Within the anti-retaliation provision are two different clauses 
that are important to distinguish: the oppositional clause and the 
participatory clause.13  Oppositional activity involves opposing 
one of the practices that is “made an unlawful employment 
practice by Title VII,” while participatory activity involves 
participating in “any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under Title VII.”14  The two clauses offer different 
amounts of statutory protection.15 
In general, to establish a prima facie claim for retaliation 
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show the following: “(1) that [he] 
engaged in a protected activity, as well as (2) that [his] employer 
took an adverse employment action against [him], and (3) that 
 
12 BANKS & KRAMER, A.L.I., supra note 2, § 1. 
13 Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 66–67 (2012). 
14 Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 896 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993). 
15 Oberti, supra note 13, at 67; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (“Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide 
broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which 
accomplishment of the Act's primary objective depends.”). 
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there was a causal link between the two events.”16  Specifically, 
to be protected under the oppositional clause, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he opposed a practice that formed the 
statutorily prohibited discrimination.17  A plaintiff can still 
receive the protection of the statute without showing that the 
practice he opposed was definitively a violation of the statute.18  
A plaintiff’s opposition to the unlawful conduct need only be 
based on a reasonable and good-faith belief that the practice 
violated the statute.19  Therefore, a plaintiff’s opposition will not 
be protected by the statute if a court finds the belief to be 
“objectively unreasonable” or the plaintiff does not “honestly 
believe” that a practice he is opposing is prohibited by statute.20 
The United States Supreme Court case, Burlington Northern 
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, is the seminal case that 
provides guidance on the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.21  
In Burlington, the plaintiff, a female who was hired as a track 
laborer,22 claimed that her employer retaliated against her in 
violation of Title VII when her job responsibilities were changed 
and when she was suspended for thirty-seven days without back 
pay.23  The Supreme Court held that the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII is not solely limited to workplace conduct.24  
Additionally, the Court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
 
16 DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
17 O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011); see also 
Oberti, supra note 13, at 67. 
18 O’Leary, 657 F.3d at 631. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.; see also Oberti, supra note 13, at 67. 
21 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006); see also 
David Long-Daniels & Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation Claims, 
28 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 437, 439 (2013) (“For the last six years, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White has been 
synonymous with Title VII retaliation.”). 
22 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57. 
23 Id. at 59. She was suspended because her immedaite supervisor claimed that 
she was being insubordinate. However, her company later determined that she had 
not been insubordinate and reinstated her to her position and awarded her backpay 
for the thirty-seven days she was suspended. Subsequently, she filed a retaliation 
charge based on her suspension. Id. at 58–59. 
24 Id. at 67 (“The scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond 
workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”); see also Long-
Daniels & Hall, supra note 21, at 440 (“The Supreme Court first reasoned that 
retaliation claims, unlike discrimination claims, are not limited to workplace 
conduct.”). 
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that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged 
action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well 
might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.” ’ ”25  Therefore, under this 
broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, a plaintiff 
can successfully assert a claim of retaliation under Title VII so 
long as the purported action would have dissuaded a reasonable 
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.26 
The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government 
of Nashville & Davidson County27 discussed whether the 
protection of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII applies to 
an employee who does not voluntarily discuss the issue of 
discrimination, but rather does so while answering questions 
during an employer’s internal investigation.28  In that case, the 
plaintiff, who was an employee of a school district, did not 
necessarily have any managerial responsibilities.29  The plaintiff 
was asked by a human resources officer whether she had on any 
occasion witnessed inappropriate behavior of another employee.30  
After describing situations in which she did witness several 
instances of sexually harassing behavior, the plaintiff was fired.31  
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a retaliation claim under Title VII, 
arguing that her employer fired her for reporting the behavior 
during the internal investigation.32 
The Supreme Court held that the protection of the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII does extend to an employee who 
discusses an issue of discrimination while answering questions 
during an employer’s internal investigation.33  To arrive at this 
conclusion, the Court looked at the definition of “oppose” within 
the statute and applied its ordinary meaning, which is “to resist 
 
25 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
26 Id. at 69–70 (“By focusing on the materiality of the challenged action and the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, we believe this standard 
will screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to 
dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about 
discrimination.”). 
27 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
28 Id. at 273. 
29 Id. at 274. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 273. 
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or antagonize . . . ; to contend against; to confront; resist; 
withstand.”34  According to the Court, the plaintiff’s descriptions 
of the employee’s behavior would qualify as “resistant” or 
“antagonistic.”35  Essentially, “[w]hen an employee communicates 
to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a 
form of employment discrimination, that communication 
virtually always constitutes the employee’s opposition to the 
activity.”36  One does not have to be active to oppose an action or 
behavior.37 
Therefore, the plaintiff’s conduct of reporting the 
discrimination to her boss during questioning rather than on her 
own initiative was considered opposition and was covered by the 
clause.38  According to the Court, there is nothing in the statute 
that would require “a freakish rule” that would protect an 
employee who voluntarily reports discrimination but not one who 
reports the discrimination when asked a question.39  There is 
nothing in the statute’s text or precedent that supports the 
“catch–22” of the employer punishing the employee for reporting 
the discrimination or having the employer “escape liability [by] 
arguing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
[any discrimination] promptly but the . . . employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer.”40 
 
34 Id. at 276 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1957)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 Id. at 277 (“ ‘Oppose’ goes beyond ‘active, consistent’ behavior in ordinary 
discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has 
taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.”). 
38 Id. at 280; see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA 
L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) [hereinafter Retaliation in EEO Office] (“While the Court’s 
decision was essential to protect the rights of employee-witnesses in internal 
investigations, it does nothing for the employees charged with responsibility for 
handling the investigation.”). 
39 Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277–78; see also Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying 
Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection of Fault, Duty, and Causation, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1409–10 (2014) [hereinafter Tortifying Retaliation] (“Calling the 
rule proposed by the employer ‘freakish,’ the Court exhibited sensitivity to the 
unfairness of a legal framework that would reward employers for adopting anti-
discrimination policies but allow them to retaliate against the employees who 
participate in them.”). 
40 Crawford, 555 U.S. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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B. The Emergence of the “Manager Rule” 
The emergence of the “manager rule” has become a contested 
issue in the retaliation context.  The manager rule was first 
introduced under retaliation claims in the Fair Labor Standards 
Act context.41  Under the FLSA, it is unlawful for any person: 
[T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or 
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in 
any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an 
industry committee.42 
According to the manager rule, an employee who is involved 
in management does not engage in a “protected activity” when he 
or she contests or differs in opinion with the actions of his or her 
employer.43  To qualify as engaging in protected activity, an 
employee must “cross the line from being an employee 
‘performing her job . . . to an employee lodging a personal 
complaint.’ ”44 
The leading case showing how the manager rule is used to 
limit the scope of protected activity is McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 
a Tenth Circuit FLSA case decided in 1996.45  The plaintiff, a 
personnel director responsible for, among other things, 
monitoring compliance with wage and hour laws, filed suit 
against her employer.46  She asserted an FLSA retaliatory 
 
41 McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996). 
42 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012). 
43 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1478). 
44 Id.; see also Colin R. Hagan, Client Update: “Manager Rule” Not the Rule in 
Fourth Circuit, SHLANSKY LAW GROUP (July 1, 2014), http://www.slglawfirm.com/ 
Assets/ManagerRule_20140701.pdf. 
The “manager rule” gives employers an increasingly-recognized defense 
against discrimination or retaliation claims based on facts that suggest the 
employee was doing his or her job. Employees are on notice that they must 
register some personal opposition to the employment practice at issue by 
participating in the identification or investigation of discrimination when it 
is not within their job description to do so, or expressing some disapproval 
of an employment practice. In courts that apply the “manager rule,” it is 
often not enough for a plaintiff to relay only the complaint of another 
employee, especially if the plaintiff is a manager, who might be the first 
person to whom an employee’s complaints are aired. 
45  McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996); see also 
Retaliation in EEO Office, supra note 38, at 17. 
46 McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1481. 
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discharge claim for being terminated after reporting possible 
company FLSA violations.47  The Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim on the ground that she was acting within her 
job responsibilities.48  According to the court, the plaintiff did not 
initiate a FLSA claim on her own behalf or on behalf of anyone 
else but rather only informed the company that others might 
institute FLSA claims against it.49  The court explained that for 
the plaintiff to be protected from retaliation, she must “step 
outside . . . her role of representing the company and either file 
(or threaten to file) an action adverse to the employer.”50  Because 
plaintiff was merely performing her job requirements by 
monitoring wage and hour issues, she did not step outside of her 
role and thus was not protected under the statute.51 
The Fifth Circuit in Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C.,52 
adopted the manager rule and also applied it in the FLSA 
context.53  In Hagan, the plaintiff was a field service manager 
who was in charge of a group of technicians.54  After the plaintiff 
was terminated, he filed a claim against his employer that he 
was retaliated against in violation of the anti-retaliation 
provisions of the FLSA.55  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that 
he was retaliated against for personally opposing a change to the 
field technicians’ schedule because it would possibly reduce their 
overtime pay.56  The plaintiff also argued that he was retaliated 
against for forwarding his technicians’ questions to the Human 
Resources department on whether the change in schedule was 
legal or not.57 
The Fifth Circuit relied on McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc. and 
held that the plaintiff did not “ ‘step outside the role’ of manager” 
when he passed along his technicians’ question to the Human 
Resources department about the legality of the schedule change, 
and his actions were therefore not considered protected activity.58  
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1487. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1486. 
51 Id. at 1487. 
52 529 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2008). 
53 Id. at 627–28. 
54 Id. at 620. 
55 Id. at 623. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 630. 
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The Fifth Circuit took the position that without the manager 
rule, almost all of the activities that a manager performs during 
the course of his employment would be considered protected 
activity.59  Without the manager rule, a normal at-will 
employment relationship could result in a “litigation minefield.”60 
The first appearance of the manager rule in the Title VII 
context occurred in the Eighth Circuit case, EEOC v. HBE 
Corp..61  One of the plaintiffs had been a director of personnel for 
a hotel corporation.62  When the corporate director of personnel 
asked the plaintiff to fire another employee, the plaintiff refused 
because he believed the decision to fire the employee was racially 
motivated.63  Subsequently, the plaintiff was discharged and filed 
complaints with the EEOC, which decided to file a lawsuit under 
Title VII on the plaintiff’s behalf.64  After a jury award for the 
plaintiff,65 the employer argued on appeal that the plaintiff did 
not step outside his normal responsibilities in opposing the 
discharge of the other employee.66  The court looked to the 
language of McKenzie67 to decide whether the plaintiff “ ‘step[ped] 
outside’ his employment role.”68  The court recognized that 
“stepping outside” one’s normal employment role entails taking 
“some action against a discrimination policy.”69  The court then 
distinguished the actions of the plaintiff in McKenzie from the 
plaintiff’s actions.70  The court held that the plaintiff “stepped 
outside” his normal managerial role by refusing to implement a  
 
 
59 Id. at 628 (“If we did not require an employee to ‘step outside the role’ or 
otherwise make clear to the employer that the employee was taking a position 
adverse to the employer, nearly every activity in the normal course of a manager's 
job would potentially be protected activity under Section 215(a)(3).”). 
60 Id. “[G]roups of employees—management employees, human resources 
employees, and legal employees, to name a few—[would] be[] difficult to discharge 
without fear of a lawsuit.” Id. 
61 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998). 
62 Id. at 549. 
63 Id. at 550. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 554. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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discriminatory company policy, whereas the plaintiff in McKenzie 
only notified management of possible violations of the law so that 
the company would not face liability.71 
II. DIFFERENT CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS ON THE APPLICATION 
OF THE “MANAGER RULE” TO TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and many 
courts have rejected the applications of the manager rule.  The 
EEOC has opined on the application of the manager rule in its 
newly proposed enforcement guidance on retaliation and related 
issues.72  It concludes that the manager rule has no place in 
relation to the opposition clause of Title VII.73  According to the 
EEOC, “Opposition encompasses employee exposure of, and 
objection to, perceived discrimination, even when those who 
engage in the opposition are managers, human resources 
personnel or other internal EEO compliance advisors to an 
employer.”74  Some examples of protected opposition offered by 
the EEOC include: 
[C]omplaining about alleged discrimination against oneself or 
others, or threatening to complain; providing information in an 
employer’s internal investigation of an EEO matter; refusing to 
obey an order reasonably believed to be discriminatory; advising 
an employer on EEO compliance; resisting sexual advances or 
intervening to protect others; passive resistance (allowing 
others to express opposition); and requesting reasonable 
accommodation for disability or religion.75 
 
 
 
 
71 Id.; see also Retaliation in EEO Office, supra note 38, at 25 (discussing how 
the court in EEOC v. HBE Corp. “manipulate[d] the employer ‘policy’ in order to find 
that the plaintiff acted . . . in ‘opposition’ to the employer . . . However, the court did 
not acknowledge that its analysis turned on what it credited as the company 
‘policy’—the written nondiscrimination policy, which the plaintiff acted to further, or 
the allegedly discriminatory actions taken by high-level employees (and in violation 
of the official nondiscrimination policy) which the plaintiff opposed.”). 
72 See generally U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Proposed Enforcement 
Guide on Retaliation and Related Issues (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/ 
guidance/retaliation-guidance.cfm. 
73 Id. at 13. (“The EEOC and the U.S. Department of Labor have rejected the so-
called ‘manager rule’ adopted by some courts . . . .”). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 25. 
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The EEOC defines the scope of the protection of the opposition 
clause by stating that the “manner of opposition be reasonable” 
and that the opposition must be based on a “reasonable and good 
faith belief that the opposed practice is unlawful.”76 
The federal circuit courts apply the manager rule in an 
inconsistent manner.  The Fourth, Second, and Sixth Circuits 
have explicitly rejected the application of the manager rule to 
Title VII cases.77  Conversely, in unpublished opinions, the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits have openly accepted the manager rule 
and applied it in Title VII cases.78 
A. The Rejection of the Manager Rule 
The Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic rejected 
applying the manager rule to Title VII cases.79  In that case, an 
employee informed the plaintiff that he had been harassed in the 
workplace and the plaintiff offered his opinion that the employee 
was a victim of sexual harassment and assisted the employee 
with the reporting and investigation.80  After the employee 
complained that the employer was not handling the situation 
properly, the plaintiff believed that the management and human 
resources (“HR”) department had been mishandling the 
employee’s complaints and contacted the HR manager to relay 
his opinion.81  After the employee filed a Title VII complaint 
against the employer and during settlement negotiations, the 
plaintiff was terminated because he had not acted in the best 
interests of the company when handling the employee’s sexual 
harassment complaints.82  The plaintiff then filed a complaint 
alleging that the defendant terminated his employment in 
violation of Title VII’s opposition clause.83 
 
76 Id. at 16. 
77 See DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 424 (4th Cir. 2015); Littlejohn 
v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 318 (2d Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir. 2000). 
78 See Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2012); 
Weeks v. Kansas, 503 F. App’x 640, 642 (10th Cir. 2012). 
79 See DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 424. 
80 Id. at 413. 
81 Id. at 414. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 415. 
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The Fourth Circuit held that the manager rule does not 
apply to Title VII claims.84  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit 
analyzed the difference between the FLSA anti-retaliation 
provision and the Title VII opposition clause, noting that the 
FLSA “is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct 
protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.”85  Also, the 
court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent goes against 
restricting the coverage of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,86 
and there was never an “endorse[ment] [of] a categorical 
exception based on an employee’s workplace duties.”87  
Additionally, the court analyzed the affirmative defense that the 
Supreme Court has provided to employers, known as the 
Faragher/Ellerth defense.88  In sum, the court warned that the 
application of the manager rule in Title VII cases would have 
employees in a managerial position “receive no protection from 
Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees 
that they are duty-bound to protect.”89 
The manager rule was also rejected for Title VII claims by 
the Second Circuit.90  In Littlejohn v. City of New York, the 
plaintiff was a director of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Office at the New York City Administration for Children’s 
Services and conducted investigations of discrimination claims as 
one of her responsibilities.91  The plaintiff claimed that she was 
 
84 Id. at 422. 
85 Id. 
86 The Supreme Court in Burlington held that the anti-retaliation provision of 
Title VII “provide[s] broad protection from retaliation.” Id. at 422 (quoting 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)). Additionally the 
Court in Crawford intended the provision to cover various types of conduct where an 
“employee communicates to an employer the employee’s ‘belief that the employer has 
engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination.’ ” Id. (quoting Crawford v. 
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009)). 
87 Id. at 423. 
88 Id.; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998); 
Burlington Indus., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Faragher and Ellerth hold 
“[a]n employer . . . subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an 
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with  . . . authority over the 
employee.” Crawford, 555 U.S. at 272 (first quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; then 
quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765). To overcome liability, the employer must show 
“1) that it acted reasonably to prevent and correct harassment; and 2) that the 
plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to prevent or mitigate harm.” Retaliation in 
EEO Office, supra note 38, at 4. 
89 DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423. 
90 See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015). 
91 Id. at 303. 
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retaliated against because she complained about racial 
discrimination in the personnel decision-making process during a 
department merger.92 
The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s employment 
status did not preclude her from participating in protected 
activities under the opposition clause of Title VII.93  The court 
looked at the plain language of Title VII’s opposition clause and 
determined that it “does not distinguish among entry-level 
employees, managers, and any other type of employee.”94  The 
court held that merely “reporting or investigating by itself is not 
a protected activity under [Title VII’s] opposition clause, because 
merely to convey others’ complaints of discrimination is not to 
oppose practices made unlawful by Title VII.”95  However, if an 
employee who is tasked with investigating and reporting 
complaints of discrimination “actively supports other employees 
in asserting their Title VII rights or personally complains or is 
critical about the discriminatory employment practices of her 
employer, that employee has engaged in a protected activity” 
under Title VII’s opposition clause.96 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. University of 
Cincinnati rejected the application of the manager rule as it 
applied to Title VII claims.97  The plaintiff was the Vice President 
of Human Resources and Human Relations at the University of 
Cincinnati,98 who claimed that he was retaliated against for his 
advocacy efforts, on behalf of women and minorities, that were in 
opposition to his employer’s alleged discriminatory employment 
practices.99  The court held that even though the plaintiff had a 
duty to come forward with his concerns, his actions were still 
protected under Title VII’s opposition clause.100  Relying on the 
guidance of the EEOC, according to the court, “the only 
qualification that is placed upon an employee’s invocation of 
protection from retaliation under Title VII’s opposition clause is 
 
92 Id. at 315. 
93 Id. at 316. 
94 Id. at 318.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. (quoting Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
97 See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000). 
98 Id. at 566. 
99 Id. at 579. 
100 Id. 
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that the manner of his opposition must be reasonable.”101  
Therefore, the employee’s job status or to whom the complaint is 
made is insignificant, as long as “the manner of [that] opposition” 
is “reasonable.”102 
B. The Application of the Manager Rule 
On the other hand, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have 
applied the manager rule to claims under Title VII.103  In Weeks 
v. Kansas, the Tenth Circuit applied the manager rule in a case 
where the plaintiff, a lawyer, believed she was terminated in 
retaliation under Title VII for reporting two allegations of 
unlawful termination to her employer and “advis[ing] him to take 
them seriously.”104  The court held that for plaintiff to have 
engaged in protected activity, she “must do more than provide 
legal advice to her employer on how best to resolve a claim of 
discrimination asserted by another employee.”105  The court 
reiterated the manager rule as described in McKenzie that the 
plaintiff must step outside her role to engage in protected activity 
under Title VII.106 
In Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., the Eleventh Circuit also 
applied the manager rule in a Title VII claim.107  After a fellow 
employee reported to plaintiff, a Loss Prevention District Coach, 
that she had been raped, the plaintiff alerted her employer and 
 
101 Id. at 580. 
102 Id. 
103 Weeks v. Kansas, 503 F. App’x 640 (10th Cir. 2012); Brush v. Sears Holdings 
Corp., 466 F. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Correa v. Mana Prods. Inc., 550 F. 
Supp. 2d 319, 322–23, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). In Correa, plaintiff was a human 
resources manager who claimed she was fired in retaliation under Title VII for 
complaining of her employer’s unlawful discriminatory practices and participating in 
internal company investigations. Correa, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 322. The court reasoned 
that the plaintiff did not step outside her role as human resource manager and did 
not file or threaten to file an action against her employer. Id. at 331. The plaintiff’s 
investigation of complaints was a part of her job description and not outside the 
scope of her employment. Id. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to 
show that she was engaged in protected activity. Id.; see also Retaliation in EEO 
Office, supra note 38, at 20 (“The Correa court’s reasoning gives employers a wide 
berth to pressure the employees in charge of EEO compliance into discouraging and 
minimizing complaints, rewarding them when complaints go away and punishing 
them when they do not.”). 
104 Weeks, 503 F. App’x at 641. 
105 Id. at 642. 
106 Id. 
107 See Brush, 466 F. App’x at 781. 
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urged them to notify law enforcement.108  After the plaintiff’s 
employer refused to report the alleged rape, the plaintiff kept 
insisting on informing law enforcement, which resulted in her 
subsequent termination.109 
The plaintiff alleged that she was dismissed in retaliation for 
opposing the nature of the investigation of the sexual harassment 
claim.110  The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s behavior 
in disagreeing with the way in which her employer conducted an 
investigation did not constitute protected activity under Title 
VII.111  According to the court, the plaintiff was tasked with 
conducting an internal investigation and was “neither the 
aggrieved nor accused party” in the matter.112  The court 
reasoned that it did not want to extend the reasoning of 
Crawford to “all individuals involved in the investigation of that 
discrimination, no matter how far distant.”113  Crawford involved 
the reporting of a harassment claim where the reporting occurred 
during a solicited internal investigation by the employer.114  The 
case did not comment on whether a third party could use a 
harassment claim as a foundation for its own action under Title 
VII.115  The Eleventh Circuit held that the manager rule applied 
and the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity under Title 
VII.116  The court held that by informing the employer of the 
harassment claims, investigating the allegations, and reporting 
the findings, the plaintiff was merely performing her 
responsibilities as a manager and did not assert any rights under 
Title VII or take any adverse actions against her employer  
 
 
 
 
 
108 Id. at 784. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 786. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 787. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 788. 
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during the investigation.117  “Disagreement with internal 
procedures does not equate with ‘protected activity’ opposing 
discriminatory practices.”118 
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF THE MANAGER RULE AND A 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 
The manager rule should continue to be applied in Title VII 
cases but in a new and very specific and detailed manner that 
tracks the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in the FLSA case Rosenfield 
v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.119 
A. Middle Ground Approach Taken by the Ninth Circuit 
The court in Rosenfield looked to the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. 
for guidance.120  In Kasten, the plaintiff claimed that his employer 
discharged him in an unlawful retaliation for orally complaining 
to officials about the location of the timeclocks.121  The plaintiff 
argued that the location of the timeclocks prevented workers 
from receiving time credit for the time that they spent putting on 
and taking off protective work gear.122  The question presented to 
the Supreme Court was “whether an oral complaint of a violation 
of the [FLSA] is protected conduct under the [FLSA’s] anti-
retaliation provision.”123 
 
117 Id. at 787; see also Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 60, 
61–62 (D.P.R. 2005). In Vidal, the plaintiff was a human resources director who told 
his employer that he was investigating sexual harassment complaints made by other 
employees against the company. Id. at 61. That same day, the plaintiff was 
terminated in what he alleged was retaliation for investigating the complaints. Id. 
The court held that plaintiff did not have a claim under Title VII. The court 
reasoned that the plaintiff was simply performing his normal job responsibilities and 
in accordance with his employer’s policies forbidding sexual harassment. Id. at 62. 
The court discussed how the plaintiff’s actions were not considered adverse to his 
employer and were part of his regular job duties. Id. Thus, the plaintiff’s actions 
were not considered as engaging in protected activity under Title VII. Id. 
118 Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787. “Under such circumstances, the breadth of 
Crawford’s application to individuals who suffered workplace discrimination is not 
transferable to the entirety of the management string that might review any such 
allegation.” Id. at 787–88. 
119 811 F.3d 282 (9th Cir. 2015). 
120 See id. at 285–88. 
121 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 5 (2011). 
122 Id. at 4–5. 
123 Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that Congress did not intend to limit the protection that the 
FLSA offers and that limiting the provision’s coverage to solely 
written complaints would defeat that objective.124  In addition to 
finding that oral complaints are included in the phrase “filed any 
complaint” in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision,125 the 
Supreme Court also established another important ruling about 
complaints in this context.  Although oral complaints are 
included within the scope of the Act, the Act is also meant “to 
establish an enforcement system that is fair to employers.”126  
The FLSA contains a fair notice element to employers.127  To be 
considered a valid complaint within the anti-retaliation 
provision, “a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for 
a reasonable employer to understand it . . . as an assertion of 
rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”128 
In Rosenfield, the plaintiff was the Director of Human 
Resources and Corporate Training for her employer.129  
Throughout the plaintiff’s employment, she consistently reported 
to her superiors that the company was not complying with the 
FLSA, and she sought to change this in order to comply with the 
statutory requirements of the statute.130  The plaintiff was 
subsequently fired and alleged that her employer fired her 
because she had engaged in the protected activity under the 
FLSA of complaining to her superiors about the company’s 
failure to comply with the FLSA.131 
The Ninth Circuit in Rosenfield was concerned with whether 
the managerial status of the plaintiff affected whether her 
complaint was within the scope of the “filed any complaint” 
phrase of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA.132  The 
Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s managerial status “form[s] 
 
124 Id. at 11. 
125 Id. at 17. 
126 Id. at 13. 
127 Id. at 14 (“As such, the phrase ‘filed any complaint’ contemplates some 
degree of formality, certainly to the point where the recipient has been given fair 
notice that a grievance has been lodged and does, or should, reasonably understand 
the matter as part of its business concerns.”). 
128 Id. 
129 Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters. Inc., 811 F.3d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 2015). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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an important part of th[e] context.”133  The court looked at the 
differences between managers and their employee counterparts 
in terms of job responsibilities.134  Specifically, employers expect 
managers to disclose “work-related concerns” and to make 
suggestions for “changes in policy.”135  Employers may not 
consider these reports to be “complaints” but rather the manager 
performing his or her normal duties and responsibilities.136  On 
the other hand, when entry-level employees voice such concerns, 
employers would most certainly recognize such a report as a 
“complaint” since it is not a part of their duties to do so.137 
Therefore, the court held that in determining whether a 
managerial employee has filed a complaint, his or her role as a 
manager is an essential element of the analysis but is not the 
sole factor to be considered.138  Looking at the fair notice rule 
established in Kasten and considering the managerial status of 
the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff’s advocacy of the 
rights of other employees could be considered by her employer as 
filing any type of complaint within the meaning of the FLSA.139  
The question of whether fair notice was given to an employer is 
determined “on a case-by-case basis.”140  In terms of the 
managerial status of the employee, the court refused to create a 
bright-line rule in deciding whether a manager “filed any 
complaint” within the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.141 
B. Benefits of the Manager Rule 
There are numerous benefits and drawbacks to applying the 
manager rule in the Title VII context.  In terms of the benefits, 
without the manager rule, some employees would have a basis 
for a retaliation claim just by performing their job 
 
133 Id. at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 287. 
139 Id. at 288. 
140 Id. at 287 (“Because Kasten requires consideration of the content and context 
of an alleged FLSA complaint, the question of fair notice must be resolved on a case-
by-case basis.”). 
141 Id. at 284, 287 (“An employee’s managerial position is only one 
consideration . . . .”). 
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responsibilities.142  Therefore, employers who are trying to 
discipline their employees for reasons unrelated to reporting 
discrimination claims could be frivolously sued.143  This would 
make it very challenging for employers to discipline their 
employees without fear of being sued for retaliation.144  
Connected to this point is that without the manager rule, there 
would likely be an increase in the amount of retaliation claims 
brought under Title VII which, in turn, could “open up the 
litigation floodgates.”145 
Some have countered that being able to bring a retaliation 
claim is much different than being able to prove it.146  To prevail 
under Title VII, employees would still have to establish a 
connection between the protected activity that they engaged in 
and the resulting adverse employment action that ensued.147  
Retaliation claims are the most difficult type of discrimination 
claims for employers to defend successfully, precisely because 
employees will most likely be able to establish the causation 
element of a retaliation claim.148  In terms of an economic and 
financial aspect, without the manager rule, opening the  
 
 
142 See Patrick Dorrian, Should Special Retaliation Rule Apply to Managers, 
HR?, BLOOMBERG: BNA (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.bna.com/special-retaliation-rule-
n57982066739 (“[E]mployees might be able to build a retaliation claim just by doing 
their job, making it risky to discipline them when it's otherwise appropriate to do 
so.”). 
143 See Tortifying Retaliation, supra note 39, at 1401 (“Courts’ embrace of the 
manager rule reflects a legitimate concern that, without it, employers would lose the 
ability to supervise job performance for some segment of the workforce.”). 
144 Id. (“The fundamental problem driving the manager rule is that, when part 
of the employee’s job is to oversee compliance with anti-discrimination law, the 
search for a retaliatory motive cannot separate the illegitimate motive of retaliation 
from the legitimate motive of job performance.”). 
145 Dorrian, supra note 142; see also Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 
F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008) (“An otherwise typical at-will employment relationship 
could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield, with whole groups of employees—
management employees, human resources employees, and legal employees, to name 
a few—being difficult to discharge without fear of a lawsuit.”). 
146 See Dorrian, supra note 142. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. (“Because these employees often are regularly engaged in taking or 
otherwise acting on bias complaints, an adverse action taken against them by their 
employer at any time might be seen—just from the close timing of events alone—as 
linked to that activity.”); see also Carol Patton, Revisiting the ‘Manager Rule,’ HUM. 
RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE 
/view/story.jhtml?id=534359834, (“Retaliation claims are horrible in that it’s so easy 
to bring one and difficult to defend.”). 
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floodgates of litigation could result in large and significant costs 
to the employers even in situations where employers are not 
found liable and where monetary damages are not awarded.149 
C. Drawbacks of the Manager Rule 
One drawback to the manager rule is that it might cause 
employees to be afraid of expressing their concerns about 
discrimination that they believe is occurring in the workplace,150 
creating a chilling effect.  Another negative aspect of the 
manager rule is the “catch–22” scenario expressed in 
DeMasters.151  If the manager rule is applied in the Title VII 
context, then employees are more likely to remain silent which, 
in turn, would make victims of such discrimination less inclined 
to use internal investigation mechanisms already established in 
their workplaces.152  By not taking advantage of these 
mechanisms, employers would be able to use the 
Faragher/Ellerth defense153 to escape liability, which could make 
for fewer successful claims and let them go unresolved.154 
Another drawback of the manager rule is that an affirmative 
defense has already been established for employers when 
employees do not utilize their employer’s internal investigation 
mechanisms.155  Because solutions for employers, like the 
Faragher/Ellerth defense, have been created by the Supreme 
Court, excluding employees in a managerial position would 
defeat the purpose of even having those employer defenses.156 
 
149 See Dorrian, supra note 142. 
150 See DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 423 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(“Applying the ‘manager rule’ in the Title VII context would discourage these very 
employees from voicing concerns about workplace discrimination and put in motion 
a downward spiral of Title VII enforcement.”). 
151 Id. at 423; see also Dorrian, supra note 142 (“[R]equiring [employees] to 
choose between fulfilling their job duties and risking possible retaliation, or 
remaining silent and risking possible employer discipline for failing to carry out 
their job responsibilities.”). 
152 DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423. 
153 See cases cited supra note 88. 
154 DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423; see also Tortifying Retaliation, supra note 39, at 
1401 (“On the other hand, the manager rule tilts the scales all the way in the 
opposite direction, causing a complete withdrawal of retaliation protection from the 
employees assigned such job responsibilities, effectively removing them from Title 
VII’s antiretaliation exception to employment at will.”). 
155 DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423. 
156 See id. 
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D. The Manager Rule Should Be Applied to Title VII Cases on a 
Case-by-Case Analysis 
Requiring employees to “step outside” their roles as 
managers and file their own adverse action against their 
employer or assist other employees in asserting their rights157 is 
too high a burden to bear.  Instead, future courts should look to 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosenfield for guidance in 
applying the manager rule to retaliation claims under Title VII.  
First, as mentioned in Rosenfield, the Supreme Court’s fair notice 
rule established in Kasten should also be applied in the Title VII 
context.158  Requiring that a complaint be clear and detailed will 
assist employers in understanding their employee’s complaints 
while simultaneously enabling employees to make those 
complaints. 
Second, to protect the interests of both employees and 
employers, an employee’s managerial status should still be taken 
into consideration in deciding whether he or she can bring a 
retaliation claim under Title VII.  One type of manager is not 
present in all types of employment.159  Looking at the specific job 
responsibilities and duties of the manager will help in deciding 
whether he or she is filing a complaint under Title VII.160  For 
example, an entry-level type manager may have the job 
responsibilities of solely overseeing the normal daily operations 
of a company and have no duties to report discrimination or 
compliance with federal statutes.161  On the other hand, a higher-
level manager may be tasked with reporting such discrimination 
claims and ensuring that the company is complying with statutes 
such as the FLSA or Title VII.162  Therefore, courts should look at 
the exact job responsibilities of the plaintiff as part of their 
analysis. 
Courts resolving retaliation claims under Title VII using a 
case-by-case analysis, which analyzes the job responsibilities of 
the employee and determines whether fair notice was given, 
would benefit both employers and employees.  First, by looking at 
 
157 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996). 
158 Rosenfield v. Globaltranz Enters., 811 F.3d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 2015). 
159 Id. at 287 (“Moreover, an employee’s status as a ‘manager’ is not entirely 
binary.”). 
160 See id. at 286. 
161 Id. at 287. 
162 Id. 
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the job responsibilities of the plaintiff, courts could analyze 
whether the employee is really opposing the conduct of the 
employer that would make it oppositional, or whether the 
employee is simply performing the designated duties of his or her 
job description.163  Second, if an employee is in fact found to have 
been opposing the conduct of an employer, the court could then 
look to see whether the employment practice being opposed is 
actually an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.164 
To aid in the analysis of a manager’s retaliation claim under 
Title VII, courts should adopt the fair notice rule established in 
Kasten:  A complaint must be clear and adequate so that a 
reasonable employer would be able to understand that the 
complaint is asserting rights that are protected by the statute 
and that the complainant is “call[ing] for their protection.”165  
Courts should also look to the guidance of Rosenfield and 
consider the managerial status of employees as a significant 
element of the case-by-case analysis.166  This type of analysis 
would also benefit employers by potentially limiting the 
“litigation minefield”167 that would ensue without the application 
of some type of manager rule, while simultaneously allowing 
employees to have their claims heard and recognized. 
CONCLUSION 
The manager rule should be applied to Title VII cases but in 
a very specific context involving a case-by-case analysis, similar 
to that of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosenfield v. 
GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.  With the rise in retaliation claims, 
neither employees nor employers should have a significant 
advantage over the other.  On the one hand, the ability to file 
claims for retaliation under Title VII should not be a more 
onerous task for employees in a managerial role.  They should 
not have to demonstrate that they have stepped outside their 
normal role of being a manager to an employee who has 
personally filed an adverse employment action against their 
employer.  Doing so may discourage employees from voicing their 
concerns about discrimination in the workplace. 
 
163 See Dorrian, supra note 142. 
164 See id. 
165 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14 (2011). 
166 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286. 
167 Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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On the other hand, not having the manager rule apply to 
Title VII cases would have employers potentially faced with 
opening the floodgates of litigation with retaliation claims.  
Employees could essentially be engaging in protected activity for 
doing their normal job activities.  Therefore, employers would 
have a difficult time trying to discipline their employees for 
reasons unrelated to their responsibilities of reporting job bias or 
discrimination complaints. 
There is a way to satisfy both parties.  The proposed solution 
of adopting the Supreme Court’s fair notice rule for complaints in 
Kasten, considering the managerial status as only one part of the 
context as established in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Rosenfield, and conducting a more detailed and factual analysis 
would satisfy both employees and employers in relation to 
retaliation claims under Title VII. 
 
